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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROY S. LUDLOW INVESTMENT
COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vsSALT LAKE COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants•
*

*

*

Case No. 189102

CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS
CORPORATION OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff in Intervention,
-vsSALT LAKE COUNTY,
Defendant in Intervention.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT SALT LAKE COUNTY

NATURE OF CASE
The original action in this case was an action in
trespass against Salt Lake County by respondent to compel Salt
Lake County to remove a road which respondent claimed was built
on his land by Salt Lake County.

After judgment was rendered

in respondent's favor in the original action, respondent filed a
supplemental complaint in trespass against Salt Lake County to
recover the value of the road built by Salt Lake County which
was removed by Salt Lake County from respondent's property after
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the ori ginal judgmei it w a s ent .ered.
' DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court found Salt Lake County liable in the
amount of $12,532.10
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant Sa] t Lake County seeks reversal of the
:nci :r

lower court's judgment against Sait La^e ."ouivy
di snii ssi ng r e s p o n d e n t ' s sup'• rr*r; * -

- --

-\

t i v e , Salt Lake C o u n t y s e e k s rovti.su,

judgment
. i

M ; ne ,i,wu: , ou 1

ma-

'- -*,dg-

m e n t a n d r e m a n d f o r a n e w t r x a i ^ A u u - * s s u e ol d a m a g e s ,
\)i /AC r . S

STATEMENT
. Septembei

**

• * *, respondent

a c t i o n h e r o i n a g a i n s t Sail Lake C o u n t s ,
* i t-s..w.-;s.-

•

road . i c r o s s mift-1
r.ju

He 'tsko' 1
v-*

Ic-mu
:

-

located

oi ^.-i., the o r i g i n a l

n i o c n v i that i t had
j

,i:» •«
..

%

WKI Mountain Viir*

d i n g a piibl ic

Subdivision,

• f . com;)! i i n v th">t *-^* Court - y remove

."* tj ^, -.. w« J:.

*v*

< •

. .•

.

the

, . defendai i t s .

In addition, Consolidated Freightways intervened as a plaintiff
agai nst Salt Lake County,
south of 2100 South

rhe road was located at 3200 West

: I I! w ; u ; 1 n li It 1 yy Sa I t Lake C o u n t y i n ] 969.

The street was dedicated as part of the Mountain View Subdivision,- which was rooo :-•-•»

u

1888,

MM Anqusr

I), 1071, I he

District Court entered judgment against Salt Lake County, holding
that 3200 West had been abandoned under Secti on 1 116, Laws of
Utah (1 8 98)

whi c ih j: >. i: "ovi ded tl lat c i 1 ligl iwa} w a s < ieemed
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abandoned

which was not worked or used for a period of J. ivo year:-.
Tl: ic i coi u: I < >rdere< I t h e re >a< i 1 e f t < :)pen t .o the publ i c

R-80-82,

, i ii order that the County could file condemnation proceedings, but
if the County did not condemn, the respondent could apply to the
R-82.

court for appropri ate reli ef,

Tl la t: de< :i si on was affirmed

by the Utah Supreme Court on July 14, 1 972,

R-199.

On October ] 8 , 1 972 , Sc iJ t Lake county employees, using
heavy equipment, removed the road from, respondent's property
and placed it on County property,,

T. 286-290,

On March 16,

1 97 3 , respondent f i 1 ed a. mot i on to f I ] e a supp] emental corripla int,
ut.jLCCjiru: uamages iw, remova. of the road by Sa] t Lake County.
March 2* , r>!>,
;-,.Dsequ-••

respondent 1 . -notion was granted.

< >t , J.:-:

,».*,. . :-;e C o u n t y

mental complaint ant: : or
R-2 4] •

T : «; v..,,

i:

On

R-2 35.

to dismiss the supple-

judgment on the pleadings were denied.
<

-

.«*.-••".---.nenta] comp] a !:".:

. August 11,

1 97 5, at w; **..:> * rii.«- L;IO Lowt:r court, awarded respondent damages
i n the amount or" $; ' / ^ ^ i - '
K.». j- M.d <,
the

- \ : ,. ,

-

z\n>- o^st: to repl ace the road.

—, . ;

.\...|. ..

..

:wst o, :cpldc.n(] some •>a:vi,,/ \.<-rk io

damages were based

ri* lege negligencr.

-,>'-*/! a • 3ii'ii::'j *:.u

-A-^63.

IC

JS

* cow

\:^

, 3 $300.00

>

K2~~J -3.

Co"*

* H V S negligent.

The

:iis judgment and the

denial of appellant 1 s moti ons to dismiss and ior judgment on
the pleadings that Sa] t Lake County appeals.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT'S CLAIM F O R DAMAGES IS N O T WAIVED U N D E R T H E UTAH
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY A C T .
Section 63-3 0-3 of Utah's G o v e r n m e n t a l Immunity A c t
p r o v i d e s that goveri imental ent i ti e s ax c i :i mmune from suI t except
as provided under the A c t ,
Governmental

This court h a s stated that the

Inimun i ty Act i s to be stri ct] y appl ied to preserve

the sovereign, immunity and to waive I t only as clearly expressed
i n the Act,

Holt v. State Road Commission, 30 u.2d 4, 511 P.2d

] 28 7 (1 97 3 ) ,
Utah Code Annotated 63-30-10, 1965, provides •'^;
pertinent:
IIWAIVER

Q F

I M M U N I T Y

F 0 R

I N J U R Y

C A U S E D

B Y

N E G L I G E N T A C T O R A D M I S S I O N OF E M P L O Y E E E X C E P T I O N S — I m m u n i t y from suit of all
g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t i e s is waived for injury
p r o x i m a t e l y caused by a negligent act or
admission of an employee committed w i t h i n
the scope of his employment except if the
injury:
(1) Arises out of the exercise ox*
performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function, whether
or not the discretion is abused, or
(2) A r i s e s out of •
:1 n t e n t i o n a l
trespass
•
."
The m e a n i n g of the phrase "discretionary f u n c t i o n " in
the Utah G o v e r n m e n t a l Immun i ty Act, wh . r:\ i . patterned
Federal Torts C l a i m s A c t ("I J.S.C. 26:,
tho courts n u m e r o u s t i m e s .
•': *•

••• t h i n

I-ho r i i e a n i i K j

after

tjle

,-s u^en construed by

A n act :i s considered a d i s c r e t i o n a r y

<>l 1: ; h e

G o v e n inie f I t a I

rimnu. .
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*

••

-i

requires deliberation and judgment and is made at a planning
level rather than at the operational level where an act amounts
only to carrying out decisions made at the planning level.
Velasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 24 U.2d 217, 469 P.2d
888 (1972); Carroll v. State, 27 U.2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972);
U.S. v. Gregory, 300 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1962).
An important factor this court has considered in
determining whether an act is discretionary is whether or not
the decision is made at the level of government where basic
governmental planning decisions are made*
Thus, in Velasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,
supra, a decision by the Public Service Commission as to the
type of safety devices it required the railroads to use was held
to be a discretionary act and immune from suit under the Governmental Immunity Act because it was a basic planning decision
made by the governmental body authorized to make such decisions.
The court noted the fact that the statute in question gives
the Public Service Commission the power to require railroads to
construct and maintain appropriate safety devices shows a legislative intent to confer a discretionary act on the Public Service
Commission.

However, the case of Carroll v. State Road Com-

mission, supra, the Court held that a decision of a road
supervisor to use earthen beams rather than signs as a means
of protecting drivers from an abandoned road was a decision at
the operational level.

The court emphasized that the decision

-5-
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was not a basic planning decision of the Road Commission itself:
"In the instant action, the decision of the
road supervisor to use beams as the sole
means of protection for the unwary traveler
was not a basic policy decision essential to
the realization or accomplishment of some
basic governmental policy, program or
objective. His decision did not require the
exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment,
and expertise on the part of the Road Commission."
In the case herein, the decision to remove the road
by the County was made in a conference between the Salt Lake
County Commissioners and a member of the Salt Lake County
Attorney1s Office, who indicated that the County had three
alternatives under the judgment of the court—to negotiate
purchase of the land, to condemn the land, or to remove the
road and place it on County property.

(Deposition of

Commissioner Ralph McClure, admitted into evidence, pp. 6-^12).
The judgment of the County Commission was to remove the road.
The decision was a planning decision by the governing body of
the County and its legal advisor and certainly was a discretionary act of judgment.

This very act of removing the road is

the basis of respondent's suit and not the operational manner in
which it was removed.

Thus, appellant Salt Lake County would

submit it is immune from suit under the Governmental Immunity
Act for the decision of the County Commission to remove the road
if there was any negligence in such decision.

If, on the other

hand, the act of removing the road is construed as an intentional
trespass because County employees went on the land of respondent,

-6-
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knowing the land was his, although believeing they had a right
to do so, then the act is still not waived under the Governmental Immunity Act,
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO
FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT AFTER JUDGMENT AND APPEAL OF THE
ORIGINAL CASE.
The purpose of Rule 15 (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which is identical to Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, is to allow a party to file a supplemental
pleading to include transactions that have occurred since the
original complaint.

Supplemental complaints have been held

proper even after judgment and appeal if the result of a
supplemental complaint would not be to reopen a case.

A good

example of this is the case of North Point Consolidated Irrigation Co. v. Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co., 23 U. 199, 63 P. 812
(1901), where the court upheld a supplemental complaint which
was filed after an appeal had reversed a lower court judgment
in a case where the issue of damages was reserved and further
proceedings were already in order.
However, supplemental pleadings have not been
allowed where the result would be to open a case after trial.
Thus, in Ebel v. Drum, 55 Fed. Supp. 186 (D. Mass. 1964), the
court denied a motion of plaintiffs therein to file a supplemental complaint under Rule 15 (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure where the result would have been to reopen the case:

-7-
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"Further, I do not believe the case should
be reopened where, as here, it has been
fully tried and a decree ordered but not
filed."
Similarly, where the supplemental complaint would allow new
relief after final disposition of a matter, it has been held
improper.

Brill v. General Industries, 234 F.2d 465 (3d Cir.

1956).
The reasons for denying a supplemental complaint in
this case are even more persuasive than in the cases cited.
Here, final judgment had been entered by the trial court and
affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court.

If a supplemental complaint

were proper after final disposition of a case by an appellate
court where the case was not remanded for a new trial or further
proceedings, then a case would never end as a party would continue
litigation indefinitely through supplemental pleadings.
POINT III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING DAMAGES FOR THE REMOVAL OF
THE ROAD, HAVING ELECTED TO HAVE THE ROAD REMOVED.
Paragraph 10 of respondent's First Cause of Action
of the original complaint against the County reads as follows:
"10. That the said defendant has and is
trespassing upon plaintiff's property and has
and is creating a public way across plaintiff's
property and as such has created a nuisance,
which nuisance should be abated and the defendant restrained and enjoined from further
creating and maintaining said nuisance." R-3.
The prayer in respondent's original complaint reads:
"That the court order the defendant
Salt Lake County to abate the nuisance and
remove the roadway from across plaintiff's
property." R-4.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Respondent did not ask for damages for the road being
on his landf or did he introduce any evidence of damage at
trial.

The judgment provides that Salt Lake County should

condemn or other appropriate relief will be granted.

Because

damages were not claimedr the only appropriate relief would have
been for the court to order the road removed.

There* is a well

established principal of law that one is estopped from seeking
inconsistent remedies for a wrong.

Midvale Motors, Inc. v.

Sanders, 19 U.2d 403, 432 P.2d 37 (1967); Farmers & Merchants
Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 4 U.2d 155f 289 P.2d
1045 (1955).
case.

That is exactly what respondent has done in this

First, he sued the County to remove the road, and then

when the County removed the road, he sued for removing the
road.

The two actions are inconsistent and, therefore, respond-

ent should be estopped under the doctrine of res judicata from
prevailing on the supplemental complaint.
POINT IV
THE COUNTY HAD AN EQUITABLE RIGHT IN THE ROAD ASIDE FROM THE
FACT RESPONDENT ASKED SALT LAKE COUNTY IN HIS COMPLAINT TO
REMOVE IT.
Although generally under the common law, improvements placed upon the land belong to the owner of the land,
there are exceptions to this rule.

Under the Occupying

Claimants Act, Utah Code Annotated 57-6-1, et seq., a landowner who, under color of title and in good faith, places an
improvement upon another's land, may sue to recover the value

-9-
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of the improvement.

Generally, such statutes are not exclusive

remedies [Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Modern Homes
Construction, 149 S.E.2d 326 (S. C. 1966); Tolson v. Madisony
307 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. 1957); Pritchard Petroleum Co. v. Farmers
Co-Op Oil and Supply Co., 190 P.2d 55 (Mont. 1938)], and under
the common law, equity will not allow a landowner to be unjustly
enriched by improvements on his own land placed by another and
will permit a suit in equity to remove improvements by one who
has mistakenly placed them on another man's land.

Citizens &

Southern National Bank v« Modern Homes Construction, supra;
Salazar v. Garcia, 222 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App. 1950); Tolson v.
Madison, supra.

The exception to the common law principle is

stated in Citizens & Southern National Bank v.

Modern Homes

Construction Co., supra, as follows:
"If the plaintiff is allowed to remove the
building, the defendant would be deprived
of nothing to which he is unjustly enriched
and would be compensated for any damage that
might result from the removal of the building. Both parties would be made whole. It
would be clearly inequitable, under the
facts alleged, to allow the defendant to be
enriched by the construction of the building on his land . . . ."
Defendant Salt Lake County did not avail itself of either of
these remedies because it believed it was already obligated to
remove the road under the judgment if it did not condemn.
However, even if it misconstrued the judgment, plaintiff should
not be unjustly enriched by receiving $12,000.00 for a road

-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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which cost

him nothing and which had no value as an improvement

on respondent's land.

Rather, damages should be limited to any

damage to respondent's land from the removal of the road.
POINT V
DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT WERE EXCESSIVE AND IMPROPERLY
MEASURED.
The trial court awarded damages solely on the basis
of testimony by respondent's expert as to what the cost to
replace the road was estimated to be. No evidence was introduced by respondent that the road was of any value to him or that
its removal decreased the value of his property.

Even assuming

that Salt Lake County misconstrued the pleadings and judgment in
respondent's original lawsuit and had no right to remove the
road, and further assuming that the County had no equitable claim
to the road, the court still granted excessive damages which were
improperly measured.
No single measure of damages has been applied in cases
where structures on real property have been destroyed.

The

proper measure of damage for damage to improvements on real
property is often the difference between the value of the land
before and after the damage.

The basic goal of the courts in

such cases is to award such amount of money as to restore the
injured party to the same property status which he occupied
immediately prior to the injury.

Alonzo v. Hills, 95 Cal.

App.2d 788, 214 P.2d 50; McCabe v. Parkersburg, 138 W. Va. 830,
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79 S.E.2d 87 (1953); 22 Am. Jur.2d Damages § 138. When courts
have allowed a different measure of damages to be used other
than change in value in the land, it has been to get more
directly at the damage done.

In this case, measuring damages

in any way other than the change in value in the land would have
just the opposite effect—that of giving respondent a windfall
at the expense of the taxpayers of Salt Lake County.

The road

cost respondent nothing, he asked that it be removed, he offered
no evidence that its removal damaged him in any way, other than
removal of some survey stakes, or that the road in any way
benefited his land.

In essence, he has been unjustly enriched

in the amount of $12,532.10.

To avoid such a result, damages

should have been awarded on the basis of the change in the value
of respondent's land by the removal of the road.

A good analogy

to this situation is the method of determining the value of an
improvement under the Occupying Claimants Act.

Under that Act,

the value of improvements mistakenly placed on anotherfs land
when one is claiming the value of such improvement is "a difference between the reasonable relative values of the land with and
without the improvements".
P.2d 387 (Utah 1949).

Reimann v. Baum, 115 U. 147, 203

In that case the court stated:

"The reasonable cost of the improvements
alone is not sufficient evidence of
value but such cost may be considered with
all other evidence of value in determining
the increase in value of the land on
account of the improvements. The obvious
reason of this rule is to limit liability
of a landowner on whose land an improvement
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has been placed by another by mistake to
the amount he has been unjustly enriched."
Here, the same principle is applicable in reverse.

To allow

respondent to recover $12,000.00, the cost of the road, where he
has shown no actual damage to his land and where the road cost
him nothing, is to unjustly enrich him and is an excessive
finding as to damage not warranted by the evidence.
CONCLUSION
The award by the trial court of damages against Salt
Lake County in excess of $12,000.00, when no evidence was presented to the trial court of any actual loss suffered by respondent, is tantamount to an award of punitive damages against the
public for the discretionary act of the County Commissioners of
removing a road which respondent had asked the County to remove
in his original complaint.

Appellant Salt Lake County would

submit that this result is not supportable under the law for
numerous reasons. First, because the act of the County was in
compliance with the prayer in respondent's complaint and the
judgment, the County was entitled, if not obligated, to remove
the road under the pleadings and judgment of the original case
and, therefore, respondent is estopped under the doctrines of
election of remedies and res judicata from the subsequent lawsuit.

Secondly, because the act was a discretionary act on the

part of the Commissioners, the County is protected from lia-

-13-
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bility under the Governmental Immunity Act.

Further, there is

no evidence of any negligence on the part of the officials of
the County in the decision to remove the road, and it was
improper for the court to make a finding of negligence when the
case was not even tried on the theory of negligence•
Even if the supplemental complaint was proper, the
damages awarded to respondent have no relationship to any actual
damage he suffered.

Because the road cost respondent nothing

and there is no evidence that it benefited his land in any
way, damages should be limited to any damage done to his property in removing the road to avoid unjustly enriching him at the
expense of the County.

In the alternative, the court should

have awarded damages on the basis of the decrease in the value
of respondent's land instead of on the basis of the cost of
replacing the road.
For these reasons, appellant Salt Lake County asks
that the judgment of the lower court be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Salt Lake County Attorney
DONALD SAWAYA
Chief Civil Deputy County Attorney
KENT S. LEWIS
Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
Salt Lake County
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